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注释:
[1] On the Shanghai uprising of 1927, see Underground: The Shanghai Communist Party and the Politics of Survival, 1927-1937 by Patricia Stranhan (Rowman & Littlefield, 1999); Shanghai on strike: The politics of Chinese labor by Elizabeth Perry (Stanford University Press, 1995); The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution by Harold Isaacs (1938 edition online, revised 2010 edition from Haymarket); and The Chinese Labor Movement, 1919-1927 by Jean Chesneaux (Stanford University Press, 1968). On Chinese participation in the Spanish Civil War, see The Call of Spain: Chinese Volunteers in the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) by Nancy Tsou and Len Tsou (Renjian Chubanshe, 2001), reviewed here: “Duo shines new light on role of Chinese volunteers in Spanish Civil War” (China Daily, 2021).
[2] See our account of the Great Leap Forward in “Sorghum & Steel,” Chuang journal, issue 1: Dead Generations (2016). For a detailed case study, see “A Commune in Sichuan?”
[3] See our account of these communist actions and writings in “Sorghum & Steel” part IV: “Ruination.” This makes use of detailed archival research and interviews with participants by Yiching Wu in Cultural Revolution at the Margins (Harvard University Press, 2014).
[4] This transition process is documented in our article “Red Dust,” Chuang, Issue 2: Frontiers. Note that by “law of value” we refer not to Ricardo’s “labor theory of value,” but to the capitalist value-form’s subordination of the world as a whole to capital’s need for endless self-expansion, such that even political parties attempting to regulate the market for some social or ecological ideal end up yielding to capital’s authority if they want to mitigate economic disaster. It’s not parties or legislators that make the ultimate laws of our world, but value. This understanding of the value-form is explained throughout “Red Dust,” but we also recommend Michael Heinrich’s Introduction to the Three Volumes of Karl Marx’s Capital, recently translated into Chinese as 政治经济学批判:马克思《资本论》导论(著:米夏埃尔·海因里希,译:张义修 、房誉),南京大学出版社,2021。
[5] Translated from 中国共产党宣言 (composed in November 1920, submitted to the Comintern in 1921), from 《中共中央文件选集》 第一册(1921—1925年).
[6] Until the 1920s, the Chinese term for “communist” (共产主义者) referred by default to anarcho-communists, since they were the first to embrace that term and translate texts by Japanese and European anarchists and Marxists into Chinese. Several founders of the CCP were anarchists, and the distinction between anarcho-communism and Marxism was not clarified until a series of debates throughout the 1920s, documented in Anarchism in the Chinese Revolution by Arif Dirlik (University of California Press, 1993).
[7] In The Dawn of Everything, David Graeber and David Wengrow demonstrate that the modern concept of communism, including the notion that individual freedom can only be achieved through social equality, also owes a great deal to European encounters with indigenous American societies since the 17th century, and subsequent discussions about their implications for the transformation of European society along the lines already proposed by earlier proto-communists of the Radical Reformation such as Müntzer. “Since the early nineteenth century, there have been lively debates about whether there was ever a thing that might legitimately referred to as ‘primitive communism’ [where] ‘communism’ always refers to communal ownership, particularly of productive resources.” While many indigenous American societies were ambiguous in this regard, combining communal with individual ownership or switching back and forth over time, most did exemplify “the original sense of ‘from each according to their abilities, to each according to their needs’”—an arrangement that “guaranteed one another the means to an autonomous life—or at least ensured no man or woman was subordinated to any other. Insofar as we can speak of communism, it existed not in opposition to but in support of individual freedom” (2021, pages 47-48).
[8] Though Mao is often credited with coining the term, this idea was not developed until the late 1970s and early 1980s, in a series of ideological debates within the Party. Xue Muqiao is often credited with being the first to systematically theorize the “primary stage of socialism” in his book China’s Socialist Economy, first published in 1979 and then substantially revised in 1983 to account for the many changes that had occurred in the intervening years.
[9] We don’t, however, turn around and take the opposite position, arguing that socialism was merely part of China’s long and tortuous transition to capitalism. This is an equally deterministic argument that is inconsistent with a communist approach to history. It also contradicts many of the evident facts about the nature of the socialist developmental regime, which was unstable and doomed to be replaced—if not by capitalism then by a global communist revolution (in which militant Chinese workers and even some CCP members might have played a role), or some other social formation—but it was only through a series of historical contingencies that the transition played out as it did.
[10] Sometimes, this confusion is caused a minor definitional issue where people think that “mode” just refers to any “way” of producing things. But for Marx and communist thinkers more generally, the term “mode of production” has always had a more specific meaning and should not be confused with the concrete methods of production.
[11] This doesn’t mean that all seemingly small-scale or local societies have no mode of production, however. The key thing is whether or not there are prevailing, “total” social relationships that define the way that humans relate with one another and with the non-human world to produce goods. The argument here is deeply influenced by the work of the communist historian Jairus Banaji, whose book Theory as History covers the debates on the mode of production in extensive detail. Similarly, the theoretical framework was informed by current scholarship on the nature and extent of the feudal mode of production in the European Middle Ages.
[12] This also means that the system was not “state capitalist,” since it was not “capitalist” in the first place. Others might argue that there existed a distorted or degenerated form of value, insofar as the developmental drive was induced by defensive geopolitical conflict with the capitalist world (and, later, with the USSR as well). But this is simply to say that areas not yet subsumed into capitalism feel its pressure. On the one hand, the point is mundane. On the other, it muddies analytic clarity about the nature and pace of the transition to capitalism since it implies that a society becomes capitalist as soon as it begins to feel any pressure from external commercial interests.
[13] 《高粱与钢铁》中文译版大概会在2023年发表于《闯》网中文译版页,期间可以先读英文原文:“Sorghum & Steel: The Socialist Developmental Regime and the Forging of China,” Chuang 1: Dead Generations (2016).
[14] 关于1927年的上海起义,见 Underground: The Shanghai Communist Party and the Politics of Survival, 1927-1937 by Patricia Stranhan (Rowman & Littlefield, 1999); Shanghai on strike: The politics of Chinese labor by Elizabeth Perry (Stanford University Press, 1995)(中译本为裴宜理,《上海罢工:中国工人政治研究》,江苏人民出版社,2001); The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution by Harold Isaacs (1938 edition online, revised 2010 edition from Haymarket)(中译本为伊罗生,《中国革命的悲剧》); 以及The Chinese Labor Movement, 1919-1927 by Jean Chesneaux (Stanford University Press, 1968). 关于中国参加西班牙内战,见倪慧如与邹宁远的《橄欖桂冠的召喚:參加西班牙內戰的中國人(1936-1939)》,人間出版社,2001或《当世界年轻的时候:参加西班牙内战的中国人(1936-1939)》,广西师范大学出版社,2013. 书评见 “Duo shines new light on role of Chinese volunteers in Spanish Civil War” (China Daily, 2021).
[15] 见我们在《高粱与钢铁》,《闯》第一期:Dead Generations (2016)里关于大跃进的论述。详细的案例研究见〈蜀中建公社?——由《紅土地》引發的思考〉(英文原文:“A Commune in Sichuan?”)。
[16] 见我们在《高粱与钢铁》第四部分“Ruination”里关于这些共产主义行动与写作的论述。该论述利用了吴一庆详细的档案研究和访谈,见Yiching Wu in Cultural Revolution at the Margins (Harvard University Press, 2014).
[17] 这个过渡过程在《闯》第二期《红尘》里有翔尽记录。注意我们说的“价值规律”所指不是李嘉图的“劳动价值论”,而是资本主义的价值形式支配整个世界,满足资本无穷的自我扩张的需要,以至于连出于某种社会或生态理想而试图监管市场的政党,它们如果想平息经济灾难,最后也只能向资本的权威屈服。构成我们世界的最终规律的不是政党或立法者,而是价值。《红尘》全文解释了如此对价值形式的理解,不过我们还推荐最近翻译成中文的政治经济学批判:马克思《资本论》导论(著:米夏埃尔·海因里希,译:张义修 、房誉),南京大学出版社,2021。
[18] 见“中国共产党宣言”。
[19] 在1920年代以前,“共产主义者”默认指无政府共产主义者,因为他们是第一批接受这个提法、将日本与欧洲的无政府主义者与马克思主义者的文本翻译成中文的人。中共的建党人当中有一些是无政府主义者,而无政府共产主义和马克思主义之间的区分,要到1920年代前后的一系列争论之后才有明确,相关记录见《中国革命中的无政府主义》阿里夫·德里克 著,孙宜学 译(广西师范大学出版社,2006)。
[20] 大卫·格雷伯(David Graeber)和大卫·温格罗(David Wengrow)在The Dawn of Everything(《万物的黎明》)里表明,现代的共产主义概念,包括个人自由只能通过社会平等实现的观点,相当程度要归功于17世纪以来欧洲人与美洲印第安诸社会的遭遇。此后讨论这些遭遇如何影响了欧洲社会转型的时候,这些讨论延续了更早的激进宗教改革派当中的早期共产主义者思路,比如闵采尔:“19世纪初以来,对于是否存在这么一个可以合理地称作‘原始共产主义’的东西一直有激烈争论,这里的共产主义总是指公有制,特别是生产资源公有制”。虽然许多美州印第安社会在这个方面模棱两可,把公有制和个人所有制结合起来或者假以时日不断摇摆,但大多还是成了“‘各尽所能各取所需’原处含义”的典范,“互相保证了通往自主生活的手段,或者说至少保证了没有人会受支配。我们要讨论共产主义的话,它并非存在于个人自由的对立,而是支持之中。” (2021, pages 47-48).
[21] 虽然这个词的出现往往被归功于毛,其实这个想法要到1970年代末和1980年代初,才在党内一系列意识形态论战之中发展而成。人们往往将“社会主义初级阶段”的系统性理论化归功于薛暮桥,他的《中国社会主义经济问题研究》初版于1979年,1983年大幅修订后再版,涉及了前些年发生了的许多变化。
[22] 然而,我们没有转向相反的立场,以为社会主义不过是中国漫长动荡的资本主义过渡中的一环。这样一种论点同样是决定论的,不符合共产主义者的历史路径,并且与许多关于社会主义发展模式性质的明显事实相悖。这种模式并不稳定,注定要被替代——替代它的若不是资本主义,就是全球的共产主义革命(中国工人,甚至一些中共党员在其中可能能够发挥作用),又或者其他某种社会构成——但是,这种过渡只能通过一系列历史偶然,才能成为今天的样子。
[23] 有时候,这种混淆是由一个定义上的小问题引发的,以为生产“方式”只不过是生产东西的所有“方式”。但是对马克思和更广泛的共产主义思想家来说,“生产方式”一词一直具备更特定的含义,不能混淆为具体的生产方法。
[24] 然而,这不意味着一切表面小规模或地方性的社会都没有生产方式。关键在于,是否存在压倒性的“总体”社会关系去界定人类生产产品的时候如何互相联系,如何与非人类世界联系。此处的论点受到共产主义历史学家贾留斯·巴纳吉(Jairus Banaji)的深远影响,他的《作为历史的理论》(Theory as History)一书翔尽涵盖了关于生产方式的争论。同样,当代学者在论述欧洲中世纪的封建生产方式性质与程度的时候,也承认了这个理论框架。
[25] 这也意味着,这个系统不是“国家资本主义”,因为它始终都没有资本主义的基本特点。其他人可能会认为,与资本主义世界(随后还包括苏联)发生防御性的地缘冲突能够推演出发展的驱动,由此来看存在某种扭曲或退化的价值形式。但这不过是在说,尚未从属于资本主义的地区感受到它的压力。一方面,这种论点流于世俗,另一方面给分析资本主义过渡的性质与速度所应有的清晰搅了浑水,因为这样做是在暗示,一个社会一旦开始感受到外部商业利益的压力,就变成资本主义的了。
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