在哔站看到了半外围论和中帝论的辩论

远航一号

§96

Typically, Marxists try to resolve antinomy of sociality (either the sum-total of individual subjects or a collective subject individuals are part of) by just grotesquely defining it as a ‘complex’ of relationships between individuals, too numerous to ground in anything definite.

§97

The concept of Dasein, properly speaking, does not necessarily even imply individuated identity, let alone a grouping of individuals - but a more fundamental and antecedent background from which individuals acquire distinction, place and identity within a world.

§98

The simultaneous quality of being open to Being, while also itself Being, implies Dasein as an incipience of thought that goes from the question of a subject faced with its object, to a quality of the ‘object’ itself, as originally discontinuous with regard to itself.

§99

A Dasein is already immersed within a world, and is a grounded existence while simultaneously corresponding to an openness of Being at issue with, or at least discontinuous with that existence. Yet said Being is nothing more than the very Being of Dasein itself.

§100

This ontological difference (between a world of beings and Being as such) is not antagonistic, since Being merely discloses itself, implying not that it is at odds with the world, only given privileged significance in the way it reveals itself to Dasein, in contrast to beings.

§101

Particular beings acquire definition in their use, or general significance, but their real meaning is always metonymic, always referring to something more fundamental than themselves: Being as such is thus also the ultimate horizon of meaningfulness to which beings are referred.

§102

The definition of a Dasein itself, lies at the point in which it faces the threshold beyond which it cannot cross, simultaneously defining the whole of what it is. Typically understood as a person’s death, but more importantly that within which Dasein may recognize its finitude.

§103

That is necessarily beyond any particular being; even individual ego. Being as such grounds the finitude of Dasein, and meaningfulness arises not simply in the physical death of a person, but in Being itself, so far as it sets upon the limits of its disclosure to a given Dasein.

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§104

Heidegger’s shortcoming lies in the ambiguity of Dasein. While Dasein is thrown into a given community, as an established horizon of being, it acquires an authentic relationship to Being only through the exercise of individual will, where it comes to acknowledge its finitude.

§105

Yet at the same time, the community is the very ground of Dasein, since ones relation toward others constitutes a given conventionally established horizon of being. What remains ambiguous is the antisocial status of the Being which discloses itself to Dasein.

§106

Experiencing finitude is necessarily individual, yet the status of the finitude of Being itself is not clear. This is heightened by the fact that for Heidegger, every determinacy of Being is metaphysical, closing the Ontological difference by reducing Being to a particular being.

§107

Though, Heidegger does not make clear how it is community acquires singularity of being, he grounds phenomenological Being the site of its conceivability, freeing it from the methodological individualism of intersubjectivity: and that is his principal achievement for Marxism.

§108

As shown, without the aid of Heidegger, Marxism inevitably regresses into metaphysics. But paradoxically, Heidegger’s understanding of metaphysics is the very chief defect of his outlook, not only condemning it to stagnation on his part, but placing it at risk of idealism.

§109

Heidegger makes no distinction, in his understanding of metaphysics, between Being in the specificity of its determination, and Being in the specificity of its understanding within the history of philosophy. He extends the label ‘metaphysics’ beyond the realm of thought.

§110

For him, metaphysics is an actuality. Thus, industrial capitalist modernity is itself the result of metaphysics and it is implied: a consequence of the history of philosophy. Obviously from an elementary Marxist, or even commonsense perspective, he gets the whole thing backwards.

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§111

To understand how Being itself acquires a specific determination, it suffices to return to the ontological difference between Being and particular beings. Heidegger situates this difference at the core of Dasein’s existential turmoil, for which Being is always at issue.

§112

This quandary, while not identical, at least parallels that of Kant, for whom the transcendental subject is likewise situated between the antinomies. So it suffices to ‘in parallel’ look to Hegel for the solution, and transpose the difference as a difference of Being itself.

§113

That is to say, the ontological difference should change the operative notion of Being in the first place, from its one-sided conception mired in the stillness of thought, to an understanding of Being as itself contradiction, difference, etc. in sum, a dialectical union of contraries.

§114

Thus Being as such acquires determinacy as an absolute ontological union of opposites, transposing the difference at the core of Dasein to a feature of Being itself. That there exists Dasein in the first place should change something about our understanding of Being itself.

§115

Yet in contrast to Hegel, it is not necessary to draw the conclusion that thought comprises the essential element in the contradiction at the heart of Being - The misstep of phenomenological Hegelians from Kojeve to Žižek, who regressed from Heidegger’s original achievement.

§116

The important conclusion is that ontology - taken not as a philosophical contemplation, but the real threshold by which mankind relates to Being as such - is itself actively suspended and itself reproduced within material reality, as the formative ground of all thought.

§117

This threshold lies not in the limits of philosophy, but in the limits of man’s existence itself, itself suspended in temporal history. Such a limit lies not in the threshold of man’s mastery over nature, but the limit by which man lives, relates to others and to things.

§118

Such a limit is not preempted by any philosophy, idea, or consciousness, but the genuine limit of man’s existence in relation to the whole of Being, conditioned not necessarily by physical limitation, but by the limit of the absolute contradiction which forms meaning itself.

§119

This can be understood as the contradiction between the givenness of being and Being as such, or between the determinate norms of civilization and their unity in a state authority, a specific frame of past and future, particular and universal, many and one, etc.

§120

Heidegger (at least in his early years) could not see that Dasein is not just a being for whom there is a question of Being - but also a being for whom that question is already resolved in a specific way. Heidegger assumed that resolution was necessarily metaphysical.

§121

While true for the history of philosophy, it is not true for living and real mankind, for whom the contradiction between the determinacy of Being and an appreciation for the ontological, is the very content of the latter. It is what gives Being itself meaning!

§122

The absolute contradiction is a contradiction of incipience, between determination and origins. The contingency of Dasein is not simply a matter of choice, as Heidegger thought, but in a determination whose ‘reason’ is only clear retroactively, like a wavefunction collapse.

§123

A civilization is the way it is, not because it is physically impossible for it to be any other way, but precisely because it is physically possible. Only by assuming one determination against a background of many, can a higher reason participate in the development of a people.

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§124

Western Marxism, before it engages in ‘historical materialist’ analysis, projects a vulgar metaphysical view (rejected by Marx & Engels) of humanity, according to which mankind dwells at the precipice of physical extinction. Thus, everything about society is reduced to survival.

§124.1

Hence, class struggle ultimately reduces to the Rational Choice Individual, and one group merely finds itself disadvantaged with regard to others, on account of being unable to fulfill the desires, or restricting the choices of individuals. What is problematic about this is clear

§124.2

It clearly contrasts with the Marxist view of class struggle, which situates class antagonism within a single division of labor, as a contradiction at the core of being itself - giving it ontological significance, rather than a result of clashing individuals.

§125

Understanding any given civilization, is simply a matter of understanding the mode of production. The problem is they never bother to ask exactly what is being produced in the first place. They begin and end with the individual, effectively arriving at no real knowledge at all.

§126

The problem of course is that the individual is situated within a more fundamental horizon by which they relate to others, to things, etc. This jibber-jabber is well-known to ‘Marxists,’ but precisely what is meant by it, at the objective material level they never make clear.

§127

A mode of production is the mode by which something is reproduced; that something can’t just be the individual. For a mode of production to be general, it must itself have a general object, otherwise the entire concept becomes completely useless.

§128

To begin, this object - which is really the specific Being of Dasein - must be a specific logic of reproduction. You could call it a unit of civilization, or a division of labor. Marxoids have devoted an eternity of soliloquies to Capital as a logic of reproduction.

§129

Capital, whose logic is standardization, abstraction, and utilitarianism is not a specific logic, but an empty universalism, which concludes with modern American ‘civilisation,’ and now a mere extension of Church of Cartesian metaphysics (govt, financial institutions etc).

§130

M-C-M’ is merely the form of reproduction of the modern European polity; the abstraction of the commodity form corresponding to the abstraction of the state. Capital is not an autonomous process, but a civilizational quandary. A deeper object has precedence over it.

§131

In a sense, Heidegger is right that ontology here possesses primacy. Before there was capitalism, there was a more fundamental way European civilization came to relate to Being as a whole. That is not to say the latter is arbitrary - on the contrary, it is world-historical.

§132

The point is that in contrast to the vulgar materialist view, all of mankind’s ‘metaphysical,’ spiritual, cultural, scientific, etc. questions, aspirations, fears and dreams were bound up with the development of capitalism, reflecting their highest relation to Being as such.

§133

To know a logic of reproduction, is to know what is most sacred, fundamental, and ontological for a given people. No abstract, mechanical geometrical, or arithmetic conception of physical production suffices to produce knowledge of any given mode of production.

§134

It is clear that Heidegger, though providing the foundation for a Marxism freed from metaphysics, hardly allows us to go this far with the concept of Dasein. But at the very least, with the help of Hegel, it is possible to grasp ontological difference as a feature of Being itself

§135

That is the second most important step to arriving at a true conception of the objectivity of society, after Heidegger’s phenomenological turn itself. That is because it establishes Being as a specific contradiction, thus having some kind of finitude beyond individual death.

§136

This does not yet tell us anything particular about any specific Dasein. For that to be possible, it is necessary to take a fundamental step beyond Heidegger and beyond the West itself. Heidegger gave us an escape from metaphysics - but not a perspective already outside of it.

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§137

It was Aleksandr Dugin who accomplished the particularization of Heidegger’s concept of Dasein, thus allowing for it to be put to work in productive, even practical ways. And he does this by returning to the beginning of metaphysics according to Heidegger - in Logos.

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§138

Logos is the first forgetting of Being, in the form of Being as the identity of difference. Whereas Heidegger identifies Being with Time, Heraclitus identified Being as change and constant flux, and thus an identity of difference itself. The beginning of Western philosophy.

§139

Dugin, rather than languish in the melodrama of the long forgetting of Being, employs Logos as a productive concept: As the logic of a given civilization’s existence, defining its particular Dasein, or ontology. This analysis is only superficially idealist, but not necessarily.

§140

Dugin claims to reject materialism as a whole. Yet only his language is metaphysical: what he describes is nothing other than the metaphysically-concealed communal being which is the premise of any application of Scientific Socialism. The kernel of his thinking is materialist.

§141

Logos is the revealed form of Dasein, cleansing Heidegger of any traces of potential subjectivism and, in a properly Hegelian manner, transposing the ontological difference itself into a determinate object. Active geopolitical analysis can then replace impotent contemplation.

§142

Dugin offers Space as a proper counterpart to Heideggerean Time, because he does not mind being ‘metaphysical,’ in the sense of grounding Being in specificity. But from a materialist perspective, going from the general to the particular is the opposite of metaphysical.

§143

Dugin is necessary for Marxism, because without specifying the communal being which is the premise of Scientific Socialism, it not only regresses into metaphysics (and cannot draw any particular insights), it becomes a cheap extension of American unipolar liberalism.

§144

Dugin may give expression to this social being in an overtly metaphysical way, but that is just halloween dressing. The important thing is that he delimits it as the very ground of thought itself, fulfilling the logic of Marxist-Leninist dialectics, beginning from the particular.

§145

Socialism in One Country reflected the precise logic that universal Communism can only be built up within a determinate communal being, not a vain pretension to the entire world, but a concrete, grounded relationship between a specific party and a specific country.

§146

Dugin’s geopolitical orientation allows for an understanding of the objectivity of civilizations beyond the formalism of statehood - states only exist to the extent that they can reflect the underlying logos of a civilization, reflected in its geography.

§146.1

For Dugin, the logos acquires particularity (beyond the mere identity of difference) where it establishes a particular logic relating one to many, identity and difference, being and becoming, stasis and flux, universal and particular, central authority and local community, etc

§146.2

Logos is stamped by a particular logic of how it relates to its own incipience, how it excludes nothingness, how a people relate to their own constitutive origins, by what means they relate to a universality, what specific limit defines their existence.

§147

The logos of civilization easily translates in Marxist terms into a specific logic of communal reproduction, which itself would mean nothing without acknowledging the primacy of ‘ontology’ - at least taken to mean the way in which mankind reproduces the conditions of Form.

§148

With Dugin, knowledge can only be derived from the ground-up: every metaphysical, noetic, even psychological assumption is suspended and imperiled phenomenally - not a single conceit of the mind can be idle in the investigation of civilizations and geopolitics.

§149

What accounts for a great deal of Dugin’s mysticism is the phenomenalization of the active intellect, which must cross beyond itself and into its real material premises, where only a language of the sublime can suffice to give expression to its objective limitations.

§150

Importantly, these limitations are put to work for Dugin - the limits of metaphysics are immanent limits of logos itself, thus enabling a positive a positive analysis and investigation of different civilizations, rather than just understanding them in terms of their differences.

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§151

This brings us to what is by far the most important contribution of Dugin, and which permits him to be characterized as a true metaphysical materialist, going beyond even Heidegger - and that is in Dugin’s concept of Chaos, the true the phenomenal form of material being.

§152

Whereas Heidegger understands in Heraclitus the beginning of Being’s oblivion, Dugin identifies at the precise incipience of Logos a dark counterpart to it - that is chaos. Chaos is not randomness, nor meaninglessness. It is really the antecedent density of material being.

§153

In contrast to the exclusive principle of Logos, based on differentiation, identity - which defines itself in contrast to the void of nothingness - chaos is an inclusive principle. It is a dark shadow of logos, corresponding to Being that it has forgotten, but which follows it.

§154

Whereas Chaos is ‘Nothing’ to the Logos (or the intellect), it is in reality something. What is this if not a precise materialist view, which asserts the primacy and antecedence of a reality which cannot ever be reduced to any product of the mind?

§155

As an inclusive principle, Logos is included within Chaos, as one of its possibilities. This reflects the history of the ‘Asiatic’ Empires, which never seem to annihilate any aspect of their being (including the conquered), but only include, and aggregate in a higher form.

§156

Chaos is a type of index of Dasein’s development, which cannot be conditioned by the forms of Being it gives rise to. It is the inert density, and eternity of material being faced by the intellect, which extends infinitely into the past, assailing its development into one Whole.

§157

This bears an obvious similarity to Solovyov’s Sophiology, which identifies the feminine divine wisdom as a fourth hypostasis of the trinity. Sophia is the Whole body of universal humanity - the infinite past of infinite divine wisdom of the accumulated history of all mankind.

§158

It is in this way that Dugin renders any Heideggerean accusation of metaphysics superfluous - for Being as such is always remembered in the positive concept of Chaos, which always subsumes Logos - a kind of parallel to the Russian relationship to European modernity.

§159

Chaos affirms that every Logos, every revealed form of Dasein or communal being, is haunted by a more fundamental material ground of existence, which has given rise to it as one of its many possibilities. This tension between Logos and Chaos is the real absolute contradiction.

§160

Translated in materialist terms, civilizations acquire objectivity not because of some static metaphysical quality (like genes), but because their determination reflects an active dialectic at the heart of material being itself. Objectivity is that which realizes a contradiction.

§161

The dialectic in question concerns the incipience of what Ilyenkov called the ‘thinking consciousness’ - which is really more like Dasein - from its opposite in material being. This contradiction is itself real (and the only real thing), and not just an illusion of our finitude.

§162

For Dugin, the concept of Chaos is reflects the inert reality of that contradiction, accumulated in all its forms, unaltered but inclusive of all possibilities. This makes for a materialism surprisingly similar to the Spinozist kind, rendering Logos a kind of attribute of Chaos…

§163

The proper counterpart of the concept of Chaos is the Lacanian ‘non-all.’ Because it precedes differentiation itself, it is ‘all,’ only, not ‘all’ as the sum-total of beings. It is ‘everything,’ but reflects the incompleteness of ‘everything’ by not to be any one form of it.

§164

The problem of the concept of Chaos and by extension Dugin’s notion of Logos is that it is still too metaphysical. It is one-sided materialism, where chaos is never truly, absolutely, and fully, imperiled in its determinations. This gives rise to a type of ‘pluralism’ in Dugin.

§165

The pluralism of different Dasein, and different Logos, is Dugin’s greatest achievement, but also his greatest weakness: Because it is undercut by an unconditionally singular concept of Chaos, which is the condition of this pluralism. Somewhat similar to Spinoza’s Substance.

§166

Dugin escapes too easily the fact of a world-historical and global ‘ontological division of labor’ by humanity. It is hardly conceivable to understand Russian logos, without also including its relation and response to the European kind. The common fate of humanity is inescapable.

§167

While Dugin is right to reject globalism, with its imposition of one ontic vision of humanity, without a shared humanity, the internal reality and development of different civilizations lose their own ground of meaning. Certainty of ones fate is certain impossibility.

§168

By this it is meant that, while a given civilization can certainly come to appreciate and acknowledge its ‘logos,’ it cannot confuse this as the final horizon of Being itself - at minimum, it must rather regard any new disclosure of Being as capable of including it.

§169

Because of this, a civilization cannot recognize its own humanity without recognizing the humanity of others - since, at the level of incipient Dasein - ones own particular Being is actively suspended in the future oriented phenomenal disclosure, known only retroactively.

§169.1

What this means is that at least on a minimal level, all civilizations of mankind share a single ontological plane, and even historical rationality (Hegel), on account of this necessary mutual recognition on the basis of openness of fate.

§170

While Dasein can be particularized, its constitutive lack of certain knowledge about what will enter its own phenomenal horizon is universal, and the same good faith a Dasein must constitutively afford for itself that it is human, it must afford for other civilizations.

远航一号

§171

This is all that humanism in Marxism amounts to: not a specific ontic view of the human elevated above reality, but a recognition of the human as that to which every knowledge returns: Only the return of an outlook, thought, etc. to its real premises, reconciles it as a being.

§172

Within Marxism-Leninism (and originally consistent with Marx), lies a sophianic view of knowledge, which is neither scholastic nor based in technological domination. Persons like Stalin and Mao had the sage-like quality of knowledge in the form of wisdom.

§173

This type of knowledge does not elevate itself above its object, but is like the Hegelian absolute knowledge, corresponding to it absolutely. In this view, knowledge of civilization does not give rise to the occasion of ‘changing’ it by premising it on the basis of consciousness.

§174

To know a thing does not always mean to possess mastery of it - to know a thing also corresponds to insight into the limit by which that thing is a necessary and rational existence. This is true for nature in the era of ecology, but it is even more true for civilizations.

§175

Communist consciousness does NOT entail the voluntary transformation of society. It entails knowledge in the form of wisdom, of the laws guiding the development of society, and this consciousness intervenes in reality only at the site of the latter’s objective contradictions.

§176

The organic development of communal being, and society, is not premised by voluntary consciousness - but by the generational wisdom that allows people to make sense of their place in the world, and their relations toward others. No ‘conscious’ conceit could possibly replace that.

§177

Societies and civilizations change - but they do not change according to the whims of consciousness. They change according to what organically makes sense to people, in ways that are compatible with their living being, and their specific logic of reproduction.

§178

The application of ‘human rights’ to the sphere of culture, is the highpoint of madness of bourgeois civilization, which is beginning to consume its own human premises. No interiority of grounded life, with its own internal logical and rational development is any longer possible.

§179

Wokeness has nothing to do with the Marxist outlook. You can BULLSHIT all you want by referencing academic bullshit. In China, there is no wokeness. In the Soviet Union, there was no wokeness. Their cultural reforms they did have had NOTHING in common with it.

§180

A logic of reproduction develops on its own terms, and only in ways that are compatible with the reproduction of units of civilization itself. Hierarchy of respect, family life, and culture all reflect objective wisdoms about what human life is, passed through generations.

§181

They are wisdoms because of what they encompass in scale: You can make up your own retarded LGBT identity from scratch. But it is not tested before the wealth of possibilities, outcomes, and experiences of a human life compatible with a civilization shared by others.

§182

The significance of Communism intervenes not in the need to create a new community, but on the contrary, to give expression to the precise indeterminateness and contradictions propelling the development of a given community. That is why it doesn’t refer to anything specific.

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§183

Nothing is more anti-communist than Communism itself. Impotent intellectual wimps like James Lindsay and other rightist idiots cannot even dream of coming close: Communism alone emancipates humanity from its objective ‘communist oppression.’

§184

Bourgeois modernity itself, and even Capital can be thought of as a ‘forms’ of communism, giving limitation to objective communal beings in a specific, universal, indiscriminate ‘form,’ the common reality of abstract, formalist, universal modernity.

§184.1

At stake in the consciousness of class struggle, is the sublation of this formal modernity, giving recognition to a contradiction at the heart of it. Communist universalism, unites the future-oriented universalism of modernity with the Sofianic infinite past.

§184.2

Class struggle, given proper ontological recognition, reflects the subsumption of modernist universalism (for Heidegger, Cartesian metaphysics) to a particular grounding of being, a particular traditional civilization and concrete development.

§184.3

Thus Communism does not try to escape modernity or the Cartesian subject, but fully go through it: giving it proper ontological status as an immanent contradiction, in sum, a dialectical object. The ‘value-form’ is finally given recognition, as torn from within.

§184.4

The value-form is immersed within the context of a definite logic of reproduction, which in fact gives it concrete particularity, and whose existence is the beginning of a type of production based on use - in other words, the so-called early stage of socialism.

§185

Communism is the inescapable reality of mankind - but only Communism as such, which “disdains to conceal its aims” objectively frees humanity from a given form of communal being, insofar as it contradicts the real content of communal being.

§186

Dasein is nothing other than Communism itself. Communism is the true horizon within which the objective communal being of a given people reveals itself, in a manner that is consistent with their world and society. Communism is the real movement of change.

远航一号

§187

Communists do not need to ‘abolish’ anything whatsoever - insofar as anything deserves to be abolish, it has already abolished itself in reality: Only in Communism, are the contradictions, changes, and aspirations of a people suspended into a single phenomenal horizon.

§188

Communism only gives expression to the ‘real communism’ already inherent in a given civilization or people, it simply NAMES this. Communism just names the excess of development, indeterminacy, and contradiction possessed by every civilization.

§189

Communism always ‘falls into place,’ in a manner that reconciles, sublates, and is compatible with existing civilizations. Communism simply names the openness of destiny itself, which in the last instance can only be known by God - but definitely not by any man.

§190

In Communism, the whole of civilization, culture, and society, is ‘lifted up’ and imperiled in the struggle of the proletariat. Only retroactively can it be known what survives past the threshold of its inevitable victory. The whole history of mankind is imperiled in it.

§191

Communism definitely is the risk that everything meaningful and human will be dissolved. Everything is ‘suspended’ into the future, which is ultimately undecidable. Faith in faith in God, faith in the people - is faith that things will fall back into place in a way that is human.

§192

The whole of the people, the whole of the country, and the whole of history is imperiled in the fight for the future. Everything is bounded up there. Everything is actively suspended in something which will not be decided without struggle. Absolutely everything is at stake.

§193

Why it is called ‘Communism’ and not something more specific, is precisely because its specificity, while an inevitability, is never fully formed. That is on account of the historical development of mankind as a continual process.