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标题: 克里姆林宫原顾问接受美国《新政治家》杂志采访 [打印本页]

作者: 远航一号 时间: 2022-4-4 00:38:17 标题: 克里姆林宫原顾问接受美国《新政治家》杂志采访

本帖最后由远航一号于 2022-4-4 00:40 编辑

https://www.newstatesman.com/wor ... on-what-putin-wants

信息量大

反映俄罗斯统治集团中一部分人对当前战争、俄罗斯战略及整个世界形势的想法

《新政治家》杂志在上世纪五十年代以前曾经是部分美国左派知识分子的杂志，现在是美国新自由主义统治集团的喉舌之一

下面的BM是《新政治家》杂志记者

SK是担任过叶利钦和普金顾问的卡拉甘诺夫

作者: 远航一号 时间: 2022-4-4 00:38:37

Aformer presidential adviser to both Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin, Sergey Karaganov is honorary chair of the Moscow think tank the Council for Foreign and Defence Policy. He is associated with a number of key ideas in Russian foreign policy, from the so-called Karaganov doctrine on the rights of ethnic Russians living abroad to the principle of “constructive destruction”, also known as the “Putin doctrine”. Karaganov is close to both Putin and his foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, and he formulated many of the ideas that led to the war in Ukraine – though he has also expressed disagreement with the idea of a long-term occupation of the country.

Karaganov has promoted the concept of “Greater Eurasia” and has defended a closer partnership with China. He is known as a foreign-policy hawk, and has argued that the long reign of the West in world politics is now at an end. On 28 March the New Statesman columnist Bruno Maçães interviewed Karaganov about his views on the war – including controversial statements on Ukrainian nationhood and denazification that would be disputed by those outside Russia – and the future of the liberal international order.

作者: 远航一号 时间: 2022-4-4 00:39:02

Bruno Maçães Why did Russia invade Ukraine?

Sergey Karaganov For 25 years, people like myself have been saying that if Nato and Western alliances expand beyond certain red lines, especially into Ukraine, there will be a war. I envisioned that scenario as far back as 1997. In 2008 President Putin said that if Ukraine’s membership of the alliance became a possibility then there will be no Ukraine. He was not listened to. So the first objective is to end Nato’s expansion. Two other objectives have been added: one is the demilitarisation of Ukraine; the other is denazification, because there are people in the Russian government concerned with the rise of ultra-nationalism in Ukraine to the extent that they think it is beginning to resemble Germany in the 1930s. There is also an aim to free the Donbas republics of eight years of constant bombardment.

There was also a strong belief that war with Ukraine was inevitable – maybe three or four years from now – which could well have taken place on Russian territory itself. So probably the Kremlin decided that if you have to fight, let’s fight on somebody else’s territory, the territory of a neighbour and a brother country, once a part of the Russian Empire. But the real war is against the Western expansion.

作者: 远航一号 时间: 2022-4-4 00:39:43

BM On 25 February Putin called on the Ukrainian army to overthrow President Volodymyr Zelensky. More recently, however, the Kremlin seems to be suggesting that it is interested in negotiating with Zelensky. Has the Kremlin changed its mind? Does it accept that Zelensky is the president of Ukraine and will remain the president of Ukraine?

SK It is a war, and we’re in the fog of war, so opinions change, aims change. At the start, maybe some thought that the Ukrainian military would arrange some kind of a coup so we would have a real power in Kyiv with whom we could negotiate – recent presidents, and especially Zelensky, are considered puppets.

作者: 远航一号 时间: 2022-4-4 00:41:16

BM You personally do not consider President Zelensky a Nazi, do you?

SK Of course not.

BM What do you think would be the final goal for the Kremlin at this point? What would be considered a successful outcome for the invasion?

SK I don’t know what the outcome of this war will be, but I think it will involve the partition of Ukraine, one way or another. Hopefully there would still be something called Ukraine left at the end. But Russia cannot afford to “lose”, so we need a kind of a victory. And if there is a sense that we are losing the war, then I think there is a definite possibility of escalation. This war is a kind of proxy war between the West and the rest – Russia being, as it has been in history, the pinnacle of “the rest” – for a future world order. The stakes of the Russian elite are very high – for them it is an existential war.

作者: 远航一号 时间: 2022-4-4 00:41:35

BM You talked about demilitarisation of Ukraine, but it seems that such a goal would not be achieved if the West continues to provide Ukraine with weapons. Do you think Russia will be tempted to stop that flow of arms, and does this risk a direct clash between Nato and Russia?

SK Absolutely! There is a growing probability of a direct clash. And we don’t know what the outcome of this would be. Maybe the Poles would fight; they are always willing. I know as a historian that Article 5 of the Nato treaty is worthless. Under Article 5 – which allows a state to call for support from other members of the alliance – nobody is obliged to actually fight on behalf of others, but nobody can be absolutely sure that there would be no such escalation. I also know from the history of American nuclear strategy that the US is unlikely to defend Europe with nuclear weapons. But there is still a chance of escalation here, so it is an abysmal scenario and I hope that some kind of a peace agreement between us and the US, and between us and Ukraine, can be reached before we go further into this unbelievably dangerous world.

作者: 远航一号 时间: 2022-4-4 00:41:49

BM If Putin asks for your advice, would you tell him that Article 5 is to be taken seriously or not? I understand from your words that it is not to be taken seriously in your view.

SK It might be that Article 5 works, and countries rally to the defence of another. But against a nuclear country like Russia… I wonder? Put it this way: if the US intervenes against a nuclear country, then the American president making that decision is mad, because it wouldn’t be 1914 or 1939; this is something bigger. So I don’t think America could possibly intervene, but we are already in a much more dangerous situation than several weeks ago. And Article 5 does not presume automatic obligations.

On Ukraine’s right to exist

BM What was your reaction to President Biden’s comment that President Putin cannot stay in power?

SK Well, President Biden often makes all kind of comments. [Afterwards,] he was corrected by his colleagues, so nobody’s taking the statement seriously.

作者: 远航一号 时间: 2022-4-4 00:42:07

BM Putin has argued that Ukraine does not exist as a nation. I would imagine that the conclusion from the events of the past weeks is that Ukraine does exist as a nation, when you have the whole population, including civilians, willing to sacrifice their lives to preserve the sovereignty and independence of their country. Does Ukraine exist as a nation, or is Ukraine just a part of Russia?

SK I am not sure whether there is a massive civilian resistance as you suggest, rather than just young men joining the army. In any case, I don’t know whether Ukraine will survive, because it has a very limited, if any, history of statehood, and it doesn’t have a state-building elite. Maybe something will grow from below, but it’s an open question… We shall see… This war – or military operation; however you call it – will decide. Maybe the Ukrainian nation will be born: I will be happy if Ukrainians have an effective, viable government – unlike the situation during the last 30 years. They were the absolute losers after the Soviet Union, because of their lack of a state-building elite.

作者: 远航一号 时间: 2022-4-4 00:42:20

BM If there is a partition, would the Russia-controlled section of Ukraine preserve a nominal independence, or would it be absorbed by Russia?

SK If the operation is to turn Ukraine into a “friendly” state, then absorption is clearly not necessary. There might be some kind of absorption – which has happened, effectively – in the Donbas republics. Whether they will be independent or not – I think they might be. Certainly there are calls for referendums there, but how you could run referendums during a conflict I do not know. So my judgement would be that some of Ukraine will become a friendly state to Russia, other parts may be partitioned. Poland will gladly take back some of parts in the west, maybe Romanians and Hungarians will, too, because the Hungarian minority in Ukraine has been suppressed along with other minorities. But we are in a full-on war; it is too hard to predict. The war is an open-ended story.

作者: 远航一号 时间: 2022-4-4 00:42:38

BM One argument is that Russia will fall under Chinese control, and this war does not help – because by isolating Russia from the West, it turns Russia into easy prey for Chinese economic influence. Are you worried that this could be the beginning of a “Chinese century” for Russia?

SK There are two answers to your question. One is that China’s economic influence in Russia and over Russia will grow. China has most of the technologies we need, and it has a lot of capital, so there is no question about that. Whether Russia would become a kind of a satellite country, according to the Chinese tradition of their Middle Kingdom, I doubt it.

If you asked me how I would describe Russia in one word, it is “sovereignty”. We defeated those who sought to rule us, starting with the Mongols, and then Carl [Charles XII] of Sweden, then Napoleon and Hitler. Also, recently, we had years of Western domination here. It was almost overwhelming. And nevertheless, you see what has happened: Russia revolted against all that. So I am not afraid of Russia becoming a part of a great China. The other reason I’m not afraid is because Chinese civilisation is very different. We have our Asian traits in our genes, and we are in part an Asian country because of this. And Siberia is at the core of the Russian empire: without Siberia, Russia wouldn’t have become a great country. And the Tatar and Mongol yoke left many traits in our society. But culturally, we are different, so I don’t think it is possible that we will become a subsidiary country.

But I am very concerned about the overwhelming economic predominance of China over the next decade. People like me have been saying precisely [that] we have to solve the Ukraine problem, we have to solve the Nato problem, so that we can be in a strong position vis-à-vis China. Now it will be much more difficult for Russia to resist Chinese power.

作者: 远航一号 时间: 2022-4-4 00:42:57

On winners and losers

BM Do you think the US is benefiting from this war?

SK At this juncture, yes, because the big losers are, in addition to Ukraine, Europe, especially if it continues with this mysterious zest for independence from Russian energy. But China is clearly the victor of this whole affair… I think the biggest loser will be Ukraine; a loser will be Russia; a great loser will be Europe; the United States will lose somewhat, but still it could very well survive as a huge island over the ocean; and the big victor is China.

BM You have argued that in the future there could be some kind of alliance between Russia and Europe – or at least some European countries, if not others. Surely now you must think there is no possibility for Europe and Russia to come closer together.

SK If we could have solved the crisis peacefully there’s no question that parts of Europe would have orientated themselves not towards Russia itself but Greater Eurasia, of which Russia would be a key part. That scenario is now postponed, but Europe needs to develop a relationship with Greater Eurasia. We lived through world wars and cold wars, and then we rebuilt our relationship. I hope that we shall do that in ten years. I hope I shall see that before I pass.

作者: 远航一号 时间: 2022-4-4 00:43:15

BM Do you think this is a moment of supreme danger for Russia?

SK I would say yes, this is an existential war. If we do not win, somehow, then I think we will have all kinds of unforeseen political repercussions which are much worse than at the beginning of the 1990s. But I believe that we will avoid that, first, because Russia will win, whatever that victory means, and second, because we have a strong and tough regime, so in any event, or if the worst happens, it will not be the dissolution of the country or collapse. I think it will be closer to a harsh authoritarian regime than to the dissolution of the country. But still, defeat is unthinkable.

BM What would qualify as defeat?

SK I do not know. That is the question. We need victory. I don’t think that, even if we conquered all of Ukraine and all the military forces of Ukraine surrendered, it would be a victory, because then we will be left with the burden of a devastated country, one devastated by 30 years of inept elite rule, and then of course devastation from our military operation. So I think at one point we need a kind of a solution which would be called peace, and which would include de facto the creation of some kind of a viable, pro-Russian government on the territory of Ukraine, and real security for the Donbas republics.

作者: 远航一号 时间: 2022-4-4 00:43:36

BM If the current stalemate were to continue for years, would that be a defeat?

SK Stalemate means a huge military operation. No, I don’t think it is possible. I am afraid it would lead to escalation, because fighting endlessly on the territory of Ukraine – even now, is not viable.

BM It’s the second time you’ve mentioned that if there is no progress it would lead to an escalation. What does “escalation” mean in this context?

SK Well, escalation in this context means that in the face of an existential threat – and that means a non-victory, by the way, or an alleged defeat – Russia could escalate, and there are dozens of places in the world where it would have a direct confrontation with the United States.

BM So your suggestion is that, on the one hand, we could have an escalation towards the possible use of nuclear weapons – if there is an existential danger to Russia – and, on the other, an escalation towards conflict in other areas beyond Ukraine. Am I following you correctly?

SK I wouldn’t rule it out. We are living in absolutely a new strategic situation. Normal logic dictates what you have said.

作者: 远航一号 时间: 2022-4-4 00:43:51

BM How do you feel personally? Do you feel tormented by what is happening?

SK We all feel like we are part of a huge event in history, and it’s not just about war in Ukraine; it’s about the final crash of the international system that was created after the Second World War and then, in a different way, was recreated after the collapse of the Soviet Union. So, we are witnessing the collapse of an economic system – of the world economic system – globalisation in this form is finished. Whatever we have had in the past is gone. And out of this we have a build-up of many crises that, because of Covid-19, we pretended did not exist. For two years, the pandemic replaced decision-making. Covid was bad enough, but now everybody has forgotten about Covid and we can see that everything is collapsing. Personally, I’m tremendously saddened. I worked for the creation of a viable and fair system. But I am part of Russia, so I only wish that we win, whatever that means.

作者: 远航一号 时间: 2022-4-4 00:44:08

On the decline of European democracy

BM Do you sometimes fear this could be the rebirth of Western power and American power; that the Ukraine war could be a moment of renewal for the American empire?

SK I don’t think so. The problem is that during the last 500 years the foundation of Western power was the military preponderance of Europeans. This foundation started eroding from the 1950s and 1960s. Then the collapse of the Soviet Union made it seem for a while that Western predominance was back, but now it is done away with, because Russia will continue to be a major military power and China is becoming a first-class military power.

So the West will never recuperate, but it doesn’t matter if it dies: Western civilisation has brought all of us great benefits, but now people like myself and others are questioning the moral foundation of Western civilisation. I think geopolitically the West will experience ups and downs. Maybe the shocks we are experiencing could bring back the better qualities of Western civilisation, and we will again see people like Roosevelt, Churchill, Adenauer, de Gaulle and Brandt back in office. But continuous shocks will of course also mean that democracy in its present form in most European countries will not survive, because under circumstances of great tension, democracies always wither away or become autocratic. These changes are inevitable.

作者: 井冈山卫士 时间: 2022-4-4 00:50:11

“But Russia cannot afford to “lose”, so we need a kind of a victory. And if there is a sense that we are losing the war, then I think there is a definite possibility of escalation. This war is a kind of proxy war between the West and the rest – Russia being, as it has been in history, the pinnacle of “the rest” – for a future world order. The stakes of the Russian elite are very high – for them it is an existential war.”

如果俄罗斯输了，这就是1991加上1941。俄罗斯统治集团将不复存在，俄罗斯民族也将从历史上消失。这确实是生存之战。因此，俄罗斯统治集团在本次战争中表现了惊人的团结，这种团结只有在历史上民族解放战争时才出现过。俄罗斯资产阶级的团结程度可能达到或超过于法国大革命时期的法国资产阶级。这在新自由主义时代是极其少见的。

作者: 远航一号 时间: 2022-4-4 00:54:02

井冈山卫士发表于 2022-4-4 00:50
“But Russia cannot afford to “lose”, so we need a kind of a victory. And if there is a sense that ...

嗯

不过我看卡拉甘诺夫严重高估了中国资产阶级的力量，这也是他们的局限性

作者: 普通人1 时间: 2022-4-4 01:34:08

如果要真正动摇世界资本主义体系，那么战争规模的扩大、事态的升级，反而是件好事，对吧？小打小闹是打不出结果的。

作者: 远航一号 时间: 2022-4-4 02:15:13

普通人1 发表于 2022-4-4 01:34
如果要真正动摇世界资本主义体系，那么战争规模的扩大、事态的升级，反而是件好事，对吧？小打小闹是打不出 ...

有可能

作者: 隐秘战线 时间: 2022-4-4 03:33:17

本帖最后由隐秘战线于 2022-4-4 03:36 编辑

普通人1 发表于 2022-4-4 01:34
如果要真正动摇世界资本主义体系，那么战争规模的扩大、事态的升级，反而是件好事，对吧？小打小闹是打不出 ...

世界大战并不可怕：第一次打出来一个社会主义国家苏俄，第二次世界大战打出来一个社会主义阵营
第三次世界大战如果爆发，就可以实现世界大同
对战争的态度，一定要一反对二不怕

作者: 蒸馏水 时间: 2022-4-4 06:14:01

本帖最后由蒸馏水于 2022-4-4 07:06 编辑

加个翻译：

作为鲍里斯·叶利钦和弗拉基米尔·普京的前总统顾问，谢尔盖·卡拉加诺夫是莫斯科智库外交和国防政策委员会的名誉主席。他与俄罗斯外交政策中的许多关键思想有关，从所谓的关于居住在国外的俄罗斯族人权利的卡拉加诺夫主义到“建设性破坏”原则（也称为“普京主义”）。卡拉加诺夫与普京和他的外交部长谢尔盖·拉夫罗夫关系密切，他提出了导致乌克兰战争的许多想法——尽管他也表示不同意长期占领该国。

卡拉加诺夫倡导“大欧亚大陆”的概念，捍卫与中国更紧密的伙伴关系。他被称为外交政策鹰派，并认为西方在世界政治中的长期统治现在已经结束。 3 月 28 日，《新政治家》专栏作家布鲁诺·马萨斯采访了卡拉加诺夫，就他对战争的看法——包括俄罗斯以外的人对乌克兰国家地位和非纳粹化的有争议的观点——以及自由国际秩序的未来。
Bruno Maçães（BM)：为什么俄罗斯入侵乌克兰？

谢尔盖卡拉加诺夫（SK）：25 年来，像我这样的人一直在说，如果北约和西方联盟超出某些红线，特别是进入乌克兰，就会发生战争。我早在 1997 年就设想过这种情况。2008 年，普京总统表示，如果乌克兰成为北约的成员，那么就没有乌克兰了。他的话没有被听进去。所以（俄乌战争的）第一个目标是结束北约的扩张。还有另外两个目标：一个是乌克兰的非军事化；另一个是去纳粹化，因为俄罗斯政府中有人担心极端民族主义在乌克兰的兴起开始类似 1930 的德国。还有一个目标是让顿巴斯共和国摆脱八年来所受到的持续轰炸。

还有一种强烈的信念是，与乌克兰的战争是不可避免的——也许三四年后——很可能发生在俄罗斯领土上。所以克里姆林宫可能决定，如果你必须打仗，就在别国的领土上开战，在曾经是俄罗斯帝国一部分的邻国和兄弟国家的领土上战斗。但真正的战争是反对西方扩张。

BM ：2 月 25 日，普京呼吁乌克兰军队推翻总统泽连斯基。然而，最近，克里姆林宫似乎暗示有兴趣与泽连斯基谈判。克里姆林宫改变主意了吗？它是否接受泽连斯基是乌克兰总统并将继续担任乌克兰总统？
SK 这是一场战争，我们在战争的迷雾中，所以意见会改变，目标会改变。一开始，也许有人认为乌克兰军方会安排某种政变，以便我们在基辅拥有可以与之谈判的真正权力——近期乌克兰的总统，尤其是泽连斯基，被视为傀儡。

BM 你个人不认为泽连斯基总统是纳粹，是吗？

SK 当然不是。

BM 您认为克里姆林宫此时的最终目标是什么？入侵的成功结果是什么？

SK 我不知道这场战争的结果是什么，但我认为它会以某种方式涉及乌克兰的分裂。希望最后还会留下一个叫做乌克兰的地方。但俄罗斯不能“输”，所以我们需要一种胜利。如果有一种我们正在输掉战争的感觉，那么我认为肯定有升级的可能性。这场战争是西方与非西方国家代理人之间，为了未来世界秩序的一场战争——俄罗斯在历史上一直是“非西方”的代表。俄罗斯精英的赌注非常高——对他们来说，这是一场生存之战。

BM 你谈到了乌克兰的非军事化，但如果西方继续向乌克兰提供武器，似乎就无法实现这样的目标。你认为俄罗斯是否会试图阻止这种武器流动，这是否会导致北约和俄罗斯之间发生直接冲突？

SK 绝对！发生直接冲突的可能性越来越大。而且我们不知道这会是什么结果。也许波兰人会打架；他们总是愿意的。作为历史学家，我知道北约条约第 5 条一文不值。根据第 5 条——允许一个国家呼吁联盟其他成员的支持——没有人有义务实际代表他人进行战斗，但没有人可以绝对确定不会出现这种升级。我从美国核战略的历史上也知道，美国不太可能用核武器保卫欧洲。但是这里仍有升级的机会，所以这是一个糟糕的情况，我希望我们和美国之间以及我们和乌克兰之间能够达成某种和平协议，这样才能避免我们滑向这种令人难以置信的危险的处境.

BM 如果普京征求你的意见，你会告诉他第 5 条是认真的还是不认真的？我从你的话中明白，在你看来，不应该认真对待。
SK 第 5 条可能有效，各国团结起来维护另一国家。但是对付像俄罗斯这样的核大国……我这么说吧：如果美国对一个有核国家进行干预，那么做出这个决定的美国总统就是疯了，因为现在不是 1914 年或 1939 年；现在是更复杂的情况。所以我认为美国不可能干预，但我们已经处于比几周前更危险的境地。并且第 5 条不假定自动被触发。

关于乌克兰的生存权

BM 你对拜登总统关于普京总统不能继续掌权的评论有何反应？

SK 好吧，拜登总统经常发表各种评论。 [后来]他被同事纠正了，所以没有人认真对待这个说法。

BM 普京认为，乌克兰并不作为一个国家存在。我想从过去几周的事件中得出的结论是，乌克兰确实作为一个国家而存在，因为包括平民在内的全体人民愿意牺牲自己的生命来维护国家的主权和独立。（所以你认为）乌克兰是作为一个国家存在的，还是只是俄罗斯的一部分？

SK 我不确定是否像你所说的那样有大规模的平民抵抗，而不仅仅是年轻人参军。无论如何，我不知道乌克兰能否幸存下来，因为它的建国历史非常有限（如果有的话），而且它没有建设国家的精英。也许某些东西会涌现，这是一个悬而未决的问题……我们将看到……这场战争——或军事行动；不管你怎么称呼它——会其决定性作用。也许乌克兰民族会诞生：如果与过去 30 年的情况不同，乌克兰出现一个有效、可行的政府，我会很高兴。他们是继苏联之后的绝对输家，因为他们缺乏建设国家的精英。

BM 如果存在分区，俄罗斯控制的乌克兰部分会保留名义上的独立性，还是会被俄罗斯吸收？

SK 如果这次行动是为了把乌克兰变成一个“友好”的国家，那么吸收显然是没有必要的。在顿巴斯共和国，可能会有某种吸收——实际上已经发生了。无论他们是否会独立——我认为他们可能会。当然，那里有公投的呼吁，但我不知道在冲突期间如何进行公投。所以我的判断是，乌克兰的一部分将成为俄罗斯的友好国家，其他部分可能会被瓜分。波兰很乐意收回西部的一些部分，也许罗马尼亚人和匈牙利人也会，因为乌克兰的匈牙利少数民族和其他少数民族一起受到了镇压。但我们正处于一场全面战争中；太难预测了。战争是一个开放式的故事。

BM 一种说法是，俄罗斯将落入中国的控制之下，而这场战争无济于事——因为通过将俄罗斯与西方隔离开来，俄罗斯很容易成为中国经济影响力的猎物。您是否担心这可能是俄罗斯“中国世纪”的开始？

SK 你的问题有两个答案。一是中国对俄罗斯的经济影响力将会增长。中国拥有我们需要的大部分技术，并且拥有大量资金，所以这是毫无疑问的。俄罗斯是否会成为中国传统里万国来朝那样的一个卫星国，我对此表示怀疑。

如果你问我如何用一个词来形容俄罗斯，那就是“主权”。我们击败了那些试图统治我们的人，从蒙古人开始，然后是瑞典的卡尔 [查理十二世]，然后是拿破仑和希特勒。此外，多年来俄罗斯受到西方几乎是压倒性的的压迫。然而，你看到了发生了什么：俄罗斯反抗了这一切。所以我不担心俄罗斯会丧失主权成为中国的附属。

我不担心另一个原因是中华文明非常不同。我们的基因中有亚洲的特征，因此我们在某种程度上是一个亚洲国家。西伯利亚是俄罗斯帝国的核心：没有西伯利亚，俄罗斯就不会成为一个伟大的国家。鞑靼人和蒙古人的统治在我们的社会中留下了许多特征。但是在文化上，我们是不同的，所以我认为我们不可能成为附属国。

但我非常担心中国在未来十年内占据压倒性的经济优势。像我这样的人一直在说，我们必须解决乌克兰问题，我们必须解决北约问题，这样我们才能在对抗中国时处于强势地位。现在俄罗斯要抵抗中国的力量将变得更加困难。
关于赢家和输家

BM 你认为美国从这场战争中受益吗？

SK 在这个时刻，是的，因为除了乌克兰之外，最大的输家是欧洲，尤其是如果它继续保持这种令人难以理解的不使用俄罗斯能源的热情。但中国显然是整个事件的受益者……我认为最大的输家将是乌克兰；输家将是俄罗斯；大输家将是欧洲；美国会有所损失，但它仍然可以作为一个巨大的海洋岛屿生存下去；最大的胜利者是中国。

BM 你曾辩称，未来俄罗斯和欧洲之间可能会结成某种联盟——或者至少是一些欧洲国家，如果不是其他国家的话。现在你肯定认为欧洲和俄罗斯不可能走得更近。

SK 如果我们能够和平解决危机，毫无疑问，欧洲部分地区将不再面向俄罗斯本身，而是面向大欧亚大陆，俄罗斯将是其中的关键部分。这种情况现在被推迟了，但欧洲需要发展与大欧亚大陆的关系。我们在经历了世界大战和冷战后重建了我们的关系。我希望我们能在十年内做到这一点。我希望我能在有生之年看到这一点。

BM 你认为这是俄罗斯最危险的时刻吗？

SK 我会说是的，这是一场存在主义的战争。如果我们出于各种原因输了战争，那么我认为我们将受到各种无法预料的政治影响，这比 1990 年代初要严重得多。但我相信我们会避免这种情况，首先，俄罗斯会赢，无论胜利意味着什么，其次，因为我们有一个强大并且强硬的政权，所以无论如何，即使最坏的情况发生，也不会是国家解体或崩溃。我认为这更接近于一个严酷的威权政权，而不是国家的解体。但是不管怎么说，失败是不可想象的。

BM 什么算失败？

SK我不知道。那是个问题。我们需要胜利。我不认为俄罗斯征服整个乌克兰，乌克兰的所有军队都投降了，是一场胜利，因为那时我们将背负一个满目疮痍的国家的重担，一个被 30 年的无能统治所摧毁的国家，当然还有我们军事行动的破坏。所以我认为在某一时刻，我们需要一种称为和平的解决方案，其中包括事实上在乌克兰领土上建立某种可行的亲俄政府，以及顿巴斯的真正安全共和国。

BM 如果目前的僵局持续多年，那会是失败吗？

SK 僵局意味着大规模的军事行动。我不认为这是可能的。恐怕僵局会导致升级，因为在乌克兰领土上无休止的战斗——即使是现在，也不可行。

BM 这是你第二次提到如果没有进展就会导致升级。在这种情况下，“升级”是什么意思？

SK 好吧，在这种情况下，升级意味着面对生存威胁——顺便说一句，这意味着没有胜利，或者所谓的失败——俄罗斯可能会升级，世界上有几十个地方会升级与美国直接对抗。

BM 所以你的建议是，一方面，如果对俄罗斯存在生存危险，可能会升级到使用核武器的问题上——另一方面，可能会升级到乌克兰以外其他地区的冲突。我这么理解你的意思，对吗？

SK 我不排除你说的可能性。我们生活在一个全新的战略形势下。正常逻辑下，你说的没错。

BM 你个人感觉如何？你对正在发生的事情感到痛苦吗？

SK 我们都觉得我们是历史上重大事件的一部分，这不仅仅是关于乌克兰的战争；这是关于二战后创建的国际体系的最终崩溃，然后以不同的方式在苏联解体后重建。因此，我们正在目睹一个经济体系的崩溃——世界经济体系的崩溃——这种形式的全球化已经结束。我们过去所拥有的一切都已经过去了。因为 Covid-19，我们对积累的许多危机视而不见。两年来，应对新冠大流行是政策的主流。 Covid 已经够糟糕了，但现在每个人都忘记了 Covid，一切都在崩溃。就个人而言，我非常难过。我致力于创建一个可行且公平的系统。但我是俄罗斯的一部分，所以我只希望我们赢，不管那意味着什么。

论欧洲民主的衰落

BM 你是否有时会担心这可能是西方强权和美国强权的重生？乌克兰战争可能是美国帝国复兴的时刻吗？

SK 我不这么认为。问题在于，在过去的 500 年里，西方力量的基础是欧洲人的军事优势。这个基础从 1950 年代和 1960 年代开始受到侵蚀。然后苏联的解体，一度让人觉得西方的优势又回来了，但现在已经消失了，因为俄罗斯将继续成为军事大国，而中国正在成为一流的军事强国。

所以西方永远不会复苏，但它死了也没关系：西方文明给我们所有人带来了巨大的利益，但现在像我和其他人这样的人正在质疑西方文明的道德基础。我认为西方将在地缘政治上经历起起伏伏。也许我们正在经历的冲击可以带给西方文明更好的品质，我们将再次看到罗斯福、丘吉尔、阿登纳、戴高乐和勃兰特等人重返政坛。但持续的冲击当然也意味着大多数欧洲国家目前形式的民主将无法生存，因为在高度紧张的情况下，民主总是会消亡或变得专制。这些变化是不可避免的。

作者: 远航一号 时间: 2022-4-4 07:08:21

蒸馏水发表于 2022-4-4 06:14
加个翻译：

作为鲍里斯·叶利钦和弗拉基米尔·普京的前总统顾问，谢尔盖·卡拉加诺夫是莫斯科智库外交和国 ...

非常感谢

是机器翻译吗？

最后还缺几段

作者: 蒸馏水 时间: 2022-4-4 07:09:47

远航一号发表于 2022-4-4 07:08
非常感谢

是机器翻译吗？

谷歌+编辑整理。我翻完一段先保存，然后再继续。现在已经全部翻完了。

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